Table of Contents
Spain’s Interior Ministry can tell you how many irregular migrants arrived by sea in 2026, and how many boats they used. It cannot tell you how many people entered Ceuta on 30 and 31 July, because those two days are missing from the count on purpose. Two programmes published for the 29 November election want to rewrite the rules that produce that number. Here is what each measure says, which legal instrument it needs, what a court has already decided, and what it would mean for the permit you hold.
What has been proposed: the full map of the immigration measures
The PP published “La Reconstrucción Nacional” on 10 November with 249 measures. The twelve that deal with immigration run from 35 to 46, and four more, from 140 to 143, form the nationality block. Vox published “Es sentido común” on 12 November: its measures 9 to 17 are immigration, 18 to 25 form the “national priority” block, and 32 deals with rental housing.
| Measure | Party | What it says | Instrument it needs | Precedent or limit | PDF page |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 35 | PP | “THERE WILL BE A SINGLE AUTHORITY FOR THE WHOLE IMMIGRATION POLICY”, coordinating every stage and reporting annually on its effect on employment, housing and public services | Regulation and administrative coordination | No constitutional limit; it creates a new body | 18 |
| 36 | PP | “THE SOUTHERN BORDER WILL HAVE MORE AGENTS AND THE SUPPORT OF THE ARMED FORCES”, including a reform so border rejection also covers swim entries to Ceuta and Melilla | Ley de Extranjería reform plus budget | STS 2965/2026: border rejection needs containment elements; without them, the art. 58.3 Ley de Extranjería return | 18 |
| 37 | PP | “THOSE WHO ENTER IRREGULARLY ACROSS THE BORDER WILL BE IDENTIFIED IN A MAXIMUM OF SEVEN DAYS…”, with returns carried out without delay | Regulation | Must coexist with the right to asylum, art. 13.4 CE | 18 |
| 38 | PP | “ASYLUM WILL WORK FOR THOSE WHO GENUINELY NEED PROTECTION” | Regulation plus international treaties | Right to asylum, art. 13.4 CE | 18 |
| 39 | PP | “ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION WILL NOT PAY FOR ANYONE”, with permanent joint police investigation teams in countries of origin and transit | Bilateral agreements | Treaties; no legislative change | 18 |
| 40 | PP | “ONLY THE LEGAL ROUTE INTO SPAIN WILL WORK”, with points-based visas and two routes for labour-shortage sectors | Regulation | The visa system already runs on regulation | 19 |
| 41 | PP | “IMMIGRATION WILL ADJUST TO THE REAL HOSTING CAPACITY OF OUR COUNTRY”, with annual quotas set by sector and reviewed against unemployment and unfilled posts | Regulation, with treaties | Quota system needs the countries of origin to agree | 19 |
| 42 | PP | “WE WILL BAN MASS AND INDISCRIMINATE REGULARISATIONS BY LAW AND ARRAIGO WILL BE EXCEPTIONAL” | Ley de Extranjería reform | DA 20ª and DA 21ª of the Reglamento would be rewritten | 19 |
| 43 | PP | “RESIDING IN SPAIN WILL REQUIRE A COMMITMENT TO INTEGRATION”: an undertaking to learn Spanish and accept the Constitution before renewing a permit | Regulation | Reaches the general régime only, not the teleworker permit | 19 |
| 44 | PP | “WHOEVER BREAKS THE LAW WILL BE EXPELLED FROM SPAIN”, with expulsion as the rule | Ley de Extranjería reform | Arts. 15 and 17 CE limit expulsion | 19 |
| 45 | PP | “RETURN ORDERS WILL BE CARRIED OUT, NOT AS UNTIL NOW”, using the new European regulation, longer internment and safe third countries | Regulation plus EU law | Must respect international protection obligations | 19 |
| 46 | PP | “WE WILL PROMOTE THE RETURN OF MINORS WITH THEIR FAMILIES AS A PRIORITY”, with age determination within 72 hours and identity fraud made a crime | Penal Code and Ley de Extranjería reform | RDL 2/2025 on minors is under constitutional challenge | 20 |
| 140 | PP | “NATIONALITY IS NOT GIVEN AWAY”, replacing the current model so nationality stops being an almost automatic consequence of time | Nationality Act reform | Arts. 11.2 and 11.3 CE | 39 |
| 141 | PP | “WE WILL DEMAND MORE TO BE SPANISH”: a new Nationality Law | Organic law | STC 13/2021 and CE art. 11.2 | 39 |
| 142 | PP | “NATIONALITY IMPLIES LOYALTY TO SPAIN”, with loss of nationality for serious crimes and no statelessness | Organic law | CE art. 11.2: no Spanish of origin may be left stateless | 39 |
| 143 | PP | “WE WILL GIVE LEGAL SECURITY TO AUTHENTIC SPANISH DESCENDANTS”, recognising nationality only for those who prove their status as descendants of Spanish exiles | Nationality Act reform | Art. 11.2 CE | 39 |
| 83, 109, 132, 164, 167, 173, 200, 210 | PP | Unannounced: “Stay tuned to the campaign to find out this new measure” | Unannounced | The programme itself says so. None is a migration measure | 28, 34, 38, 44, 45, 46, 50, 51 |
| 9 | Vox | “Not one more. After receiving 5 million people in 5 years Spain cannot take in more immigrants. Prohibition of mass regularisations” | Ley de Extranjería reform | DA 20ª and DA 21ª | 13 |
| 10 | Vox | Hardening the requirements for acquiring Spanish nationality, and review of fraudulently granted nationality | Organic law | CE art. 11.2 | 13 |
| 11 | Vox | “Suppression of the institution of arraigo as a way to curb illegal immigration…”, and withdrawal of the fast routes to nationality | Ley de Extranjería reform plus Civil Code | DA 21ª of the Reglamento | 13 |
| 12 | Vox | “Repatriation of those who remain in an irregular situation…” | Regulation plus EU law | Must respect international protection obligations | 13 |
| 13 | Vox | “Remigration. Plan to facilitate the return to their countries of foreigners who do not contribute or live off public benefits below what Spaniards receive” | Ley de Extranjería reform | Tests against family life, art. 39 CE, and non-discrimination | 13 |
| 14 | Vox | Deportation of those who commit serious offences or make minor offending a way of life, and of those who impose customs incompatible with the dignity of women | Ley de Extranjería reform | Arts. 14 and 16 CE on equality and belief | 13 |
| 15 | Vox | “The unaccompanied minors, with their families. Return of unaccompanied foreign minors to their parents or to the guardianship of their countries of origin” | Ley de Extranjería reform plus minors legislation | Best interests of the minor; RDL 2/2025 challenged | 13-14 |
| 16 | Vox | “Not one euro to NGOs that collaborate with the pull effect”: ending all funding for organisations that promote or sustain illegal immigration | Organic law on budgets | Art. 22 CE protects the right to association | 14 |
| 17 | Vox | “End of development cooperation with countries that do not collaborate in managing migratory flows” | Organic law on budgets | International treaty commitments | 14 |
| 18 | Vox | “In Spain, Spaniards first”: preferential access to public housing, nursery places, meal vouchers, transport, aid, benefits and social services | Organic law or ordinary law depending on the benefit | CE art. 139 on equal rights across the State | 16 |
| 19 | Vox | “Suppressing all social aid and benefits for illegal immigrants” | Organic law | Arts. 13.1 and 14 CE | 16 |
| 20 | Vox | “Guaranteeing the sustainability of the health system…”, excluding irregular immigrants except in serious emergencies, and auditing the cost of mass immigration | Organic law | Right to health, art. 43 CE | 16 |
| 21 | Vox | “Levy on remittances abroad. The money generated here has to improve the economy and the services of those who live in Spain” | Ordinary law with budget allocation | No rate, no base and no calendar appear in the text | 16 |
| 22 | Vox | “The Minimum Basic Income will cover only the needs of Spaniards with fewer resources”, and promoting the return of immigrants who receive it | Organic law | Arts. 13.1 and 14 CE | 16 |
| 23 | Vox | “Plan for the return to our Nation of Spaniards who had to leave Spain in recent years for lack of opportunities…” | Ordinary law | No constitutional limit | 16 |
| 24 | Vox | “Guaranteeing attention to the most disadvantaged Spaniards”, with a plan to revive neighbourhoods, municipalities and provinces abandoned for decades | Ordinary law | No constitutional limit | 17 |
| 25 | Vox | “Setting in motion all the measures needed to guarantee the quality of public services…”, especially in education, health, security and justice | Ordinary law | Art. 139 on equal rights across the State | 17 |
| 32 | Vox | “Prohibition of renting to illegal immigrants”, requiring prior verification of legal residence for any rental contract, and checks on fraudulent address registration | Ley de Extranjería reform plus housing law | Right to housing, art. 47 CE | 20 |
Two gaps remain open. The PP programme leaves eight measures unannounced, each one printed only as “stay tuned to the campaign”. And Vox’s remittance levy states no rate, no base and no start date. Neither party has published the detail the law would need.
The legal machinery: which instrument each measure needs
Most of what both parties promise can be done with a royal decree. That is the part the programmes never say out loud.
Spain has four levels. A regulation develops a law and changes detail. An ordinary law sets general rules. An organic law is stricter, and article 81.2 of the Constitution defines it: “the approval, amendment or repeal of organic laws requires an absolute majority of the Congress, in a final vote on the whole bill”. A constitutional amendment needs three fifths of both Houses, and article 167.1 adds a joint committee when the two Chambers disagree.
The baseline for immigration is already low. The Reglamento de la Ley Orgánica 4/2000, approved by RD 1155/2024, runs the rules on stays, renewals and arraigo. So the PP’s points-based visas, its quotas and its integration undertaking are decree-level work. Vox’s ban on mass regularisations, its suppression of arraigo and its repatriation plan need an ordinary law, because they change the Ley de Extranjería itself.
Four items are harder. The PP’s new Nationality Law and its loss-of-nationality rules (m.141 and m.142) need an organic law, and m.142 runs straight into article 11.2 of the Constitution. Vox’s abolition of arraigo touches DA 21ª of the Reglamento, and its restriction of the Minimum Basic Income (m.22) touches a benefit millions of people receive. Vox’s NGO funding cut (m.16) and its end to development cooperation (m.17) sit in the state budget, which is an organic law.
For you, the difference is concrete. A decree can be drafted, published and applied inside a year. An organic law needs an absolute majority in the Congress, a Senate that can delay it and a new government’s time. If your permit depends on a rule that sits in an organic law, a change in that rule is a much longer project than a change in a regulation, whatever the programme says. If your file depends on a regulation, you are looking at a faster route. Ask your lawyer which of the two your own case turns on.
The Constitution sets limits: article 11.2 and loss of nationality
The PP’s measure 142 says “We will make the legal consequences harsher for those who acquired Spanish nationality through fraud, falsity or concealment”. It also provides for loss of nationality for those who are not Spanish of origin when there is a firm conviction for certain serious crimes against life, sexual liberty, national security, the integrity of the State or the international community, while “avoiding in any case situations of statelessness”.
Article 11.2 of the Constitution is one sentence long, and it is the limit: “No person of Spanish origin may be deprived of his or her nationality.” Article 11.3 opens the door to dual nationality treaties with the Ibero-American countries, which is why the same question keeps coming back.
What the Constitutional Court has already decided here is narrower than the programmes suggest: look at the exact scope of each judgment. The Court ruled on the special border-rejection regime for Ceuta and Melilla in STC 172/2020, of 19 November 2020, and again in STC 13/2021, of 28 January 2021. Both cases test the same rule: whether the state can turn someone away at the border without the guarantees of an ordinary administrative act. Neither judgment is about nationality.
What the courts have already decided
Three rulings have already mapped the hardest ground these proposals cross.
The Supreme Court ruled on 29 June 2026 in STS 2965/2026 that border rejection does not apply to someone reaching Ceuta by swimming where there are no maritime containment elements. As the EUAA case-law database summarises it: border rejection under the special regime for Ceuta and Melilla applies only to those attempting to cross the border by overcoming established border containment elements, and the regime could apply if maritime containment elements were established along the border and people tried to overcome them. The Constitutional Court had already set the terms in STC 172/2020, of 19 November 2020, through a constitutionally conforming interpretation of the border-rejection rule, and confirmed them in STC 13/2021, of 28 January 2021. Both Constitutional Court cases concern the Ley Orgánica 4/2015 on citizen security, not immigration regularisations and not nationality.
That matters for PP measure 36. The programme proposes extending border rejection so it covers swim entries to Ceuta and Melilla. The Supreme Court has just decided that swimming in is not enough on its own, and if you are watching the southern border this year, that is the line the programme has to cross.
Andalusia filed a constitutional challenge against Royal Decree-law 2/2025, of 18 March, on the emergency measures for unaccompanied minors. The Constitutional Court admitted it for processing by order of 8 July 2025, and six other autonomous communities followed. That decree is what PP measure 46 would rework.
The numbers: what the official data says and what it does not
The Interior Ministry’s own report, covering 1 January to 31 October 2026, puts irregular arrivals at 32,942. The same period of 2025 recorded 30,263, so the year is running 8.9% higher. By sea, 28,155 people arrived against 27,001, and 1,032 boats were used against 1,066. The Canary Islands took 13,327, down 5.5% from 14,099, with 160 boats against 231. The Peninsula and the Balearics took 14,803 by sea, up 15%. Ceuta and Melilla took 4,787 by land, against 3,262.
Now the condition attached to those numbers, because it is the whole point: “the entries produced on 30 and 31 July, which have already been subject to triage, are not included”. The mass entry into Ceuta is outside the count.
Nobody has published an official total for it. The Interior Ministry said on 31 July that about 50,000 had arrived and more than 37,500 had returned. The minister raised the range to between 50,000 and 60,000 on 1 August. On 4 August the Ministry put the figure at 72,000, said about 2,000 were still in the city and announced the return of 70,000. The minister for territorial policy put it at 80,000 on 10 August. Ceuta’s regional government said 13,000 people were still there on 16 September, and the Ministry’s figure was 5,000. The Guardia Civil told the judge hearing the case in the Audiencia Nacional, in a report dated 27 October, that 88,146 people had returned to Morocco, with 862 sea rescues and 90 deaths.
So the number you read depends on who you ask and on when. The Ministry’s statistical series excludes the episode, its own political statements changed four times, and the most recent figure comes from the Guardia Civil in a court file. If you are weighing what a policy change would mean for you, treat 32,942 as the regular flow and the Ceuta event as an unmeasured one. Anyone who quotes you a single definitive figure for Ceuta is picking one of those dates on your behalf.
The regularisation runs the same way. The extraordinary process opened on 16 April and closed on 30 June. The Ministry of Inclusion published 1,174,978 applications received, 609,737 files processed as of 2 July, and 159,097 people registered with Social Security as a result by 30 June. The government told Congress on 7 July that the procedure ran until 30 September and that it did not hold the disaggregated data, awaiting a final balance. No published count of granted authorisations exists. Any figure you read, including “up to half a million”, is an estimate, and the application count above is the only official one you can cite.
What changes for you this week, and what has not changed yet
Nothing changes for you this week. The campaign runs from 13 to 27 November, the vote is on 29 November, and the two Chambers meet in constitutive session on 23 December at ten in the morning. That timetable is fixed by Royal Decree 806/2026, of 5 October. A measure that needs an organic law cannot exist before that session, and most of these need one. Until the text exists, your permit, your arraigo file and your nationality application stay exactly where they are.
Your permit and your arraigo: RD 316/2026, of 14 April, added DA 20ª and DA 21ª to the Reglamento. DA 20ª opens arraigo to international-protection applicants whose application or appeal is still unresolved. DA 21ª is the extraordinary arraigo for this round: it covers people who were in Spain before 1 January 2026 and can show work, cohabitation with minors or dependants, or a situation of special social fragility. Vox measures 9 and 11 would remove both routes. The PP’s measure 42 would make arraigo exceptional. If you filed under either provision, you are in the group those proposals are aimed at, and the difference between the two programmes is the difference between a route that stays and a route that disappears.
If you telework, your permit is a different one, and the distinction matters for you. The international teleworker permit sits in Ley 14/2013, articles 74 bis to 74 quinquies, outside the general régime. That is why PP measure 43’s integration undertaking does not automatically reach you. We published the verified income thresholds for that permit, country by country, in our digital nomad visa requirements piece.
For your own papers, the pages that still apply are the Spain residence permit guide, the Spanish nationality routes reference, and the dual nationality comparison if your family spans two countries. Nothing on those pages changes on 29 November.
How it is really decided: the Senate pact and what an election programme is not
On 26 October, the day the candidacy registration deadline expired, the PP and Vox closed an agreement to coordinate their Senate lists. It covers 23 provinces; the Senate is elected in 60 constituencies. Vox does not run in six (Cádiz, Valencia, Castellón, Las Palmas, Santa Cruz de Tenerife and Baleares), where the PP includes an “independent” proposed by Vox, and it runs a single candidate in fourteen more. The PP stands down in three: Gipuzkoa, Girona and Tarragona.
That is an agreement about Senate candidacies. It is not a parliamentary majority, and it is not a coalition pact for the Moncloa. On 8 November, Feijóo told El País that “forming a government coalition with Vox does not depend on me”, and said his goal is to govern alone with a sufficient majority. His own words, published the day before his first rally, are the clearest statement of where the agreement stops.
And Vox’s priority-national block is already inside the PP programme. Vox measure 18 gives Spaniards preferential access to public housing, nursery places, meal vouchers and social services. The PP programme already contains measures on integration undertakings and the hosting capacity of the country. So the open question for 29 November is not whether these parties have an immigration programme. They do, in writing, with measure numbers and PDF pages. The question you should be asking is which of them reaches the ordinary law, and how much of it survives the organic-law threshold.
FAQ
Do the proposals change if the PP and Vox do not form a government?
Not on 29 November, and not for months after it. A proposal is a proposal until the instrument that carries it exists. The party or parties that win need a majority in the Congress, and for the organic-law items they need an absolute majority, with the Senate able to delay the text.
Is the international teleworker permit part of the “general régime”?
No. It sits in Ley 14/2013, articles 74 bis to 74 quinquies, as a separate regime. That is why the PP’s integration undertaking for permit renewals, measure 43, does not automatically reach a teleworker permit holder.
How many authorisations has the extraordinary regularisation granted?
No official count exists yet. The Ministry of Inclusion published 1,174,978 applications received, 609,737 files processed as of 2 July 2026, and 159,097 people registered with Social Security as a result by 30 June. The government told Congress on 7 July that it was awaiting a final balance.
Can you lose Spanish nationality and be left with none?
Article 11.2 of the Constitution says no: “No person of Spanish origin may be deprived of his or her nationality.” The PP’s measure 142 itself promises to avoid statelessness cases. The Constitutional Court’s rulings on this area concern the Ceuta border regime, not nationality.
How many measures in the PP programme are unannounced?
Eight: 83, 109, 132, 164, 167, 173, 200 and 210. The programme prints each one as “stay tuned to the campaign to find out this new measure”. None of the eight is a migration measure.
Sources
- PP, “La Reconstrucción Nacional”, 249 measures, 10 November 2026 - programme PDF
- Vox, “Es sentido común”, 115 measures, 12 November 2026 - programme PDF
- Spanish Constitution, arts. 11.2, 13.4, 14, 16, 18, 22, 39, 43, 47, 81.2, 139 and 167.1 - BOE bilingual text
- STC 172/2020, of 19 November 2020 - Constitutional Court, full text
- STC 13/2021, of 28 January 2021 - Constitutional Court
- STS 2965/2026, of 29 June 2026 - EUAA case-law database, ECLI:ES:TS:2026:2965
- Royal Decree 806/2026, of 5 October 2026 - BOE, election calendar
- Ministry of the Interior, irregular immigration report 1 Jan - 31 Oct 2026
- Ministry of Inclusion, 1,174,978 regularisation applications - 2 July 2026
- Government answer to written question 184/41607 - Congress, 7 July 2026
- Guardia Civil figures on the Ceuta mass entry - RTVE, 6 November 2026
- RDL 2/2025, of 18 March 2025 and Andalusia’s challenge, admitted 8 July 2025 - BOE
- RD 316/2026, of 14 April 2026 - BOE, DA 20ª and DA 21ª
- PP and Vox close their Senate-list agreement - El País, 26 October 2026
- Feijóo on a Vox coalition - El País, 8 November 2026